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The Born rule assigns a probability to any possible outcome of a quantum measurement, but leaves
open the question how these probabilities are to be interpreted and, in particular, how they relate
to the outcome observed in an actual experiment. We propose to avoid this question by replacing
the Born rule with two non-probabilistic postulates: (i) the projector associated to the observed
outcome must have a positive overlap with the state of the measured system; (ii) statements about
observed outcomes are robust, that is, remain valid under small perturbations of the state. We show
that the two postulates suffice to retrieve the interpretations of the Born rule that are commonly
used for analysing experimental data.
I. INTRODUCTION
In standard quantum mechanics the Born rule [1] has
the status of a postulate. It builds upon two other postu-
lates of the theory, namely that the states of a quantum
system can be represented by normalised vectors ψ in a
Hilbert space H (which may include auxiliary systems)
and that measurements correspond to families {piz}z∈Z
of projectors that sum up to the identity on H.1 The aim
of the Born rule is to relate these purely mathematical
concepts to experimental observations.2 It asserts that if
a system in state ψ is subject to a measurement {piz}z∈Z
then outcome z ∈ Z is observed with probability
Pψ(z) = ‖pizψ‖2 . (?)
This expression is sometimes termed the “probabilistic
axiom” of quantum theory. However, unless the notion
of probabilities is given a physical interpretation, (?) re-
mains an ambiguous — if not an empty — statement [2].
In other words, it is necessary to specify in what sense
the real-valued number Pψ(z) assigned to z relates to the
actual observation of z (cf. Fig. 1).
There exists a plethora of literature on how to give
meaning to the mathematical notion of probabilities, and
hence how to understand (?) and use it to analyse exper-
imental data. Here we consider the two most common
interpretations of probabilities, frequentist probabilities
and Bayesian probabilities. Each of them leads to a spe-
cific reading of (?), which, for later reference, we term
BornF and BornB, respectively. We will make these pre-
cise in Sections IV and V, based on a framework to be
introduced in Section III.
• BornF relates (?) to an experiment where the mea-
surement is repeated many times under identical
∗ renner@ethz.ch
1 Alternatively, one may use density operators to specify the sys-
tem’s states. However, as the Born rule plays a significant role
for justifying the density operator formalism, we omit it here in
order to avoid any possible circularity in our arguments.
2 In other physical theories, such as classical mechanics, the rela-
tion between the mathematical formalism and experimental ob-
servations is more intuitive and not usually specified explicitly.
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Figure 1. The need of an interpretation. The Born rule (?)
relates amplitudes to probabilities, both of them being purely
mathematical notions. To link them to actual observations,
the probabilities need to be equipped with an interpretation.
initial conditions. Pψ(z) is interpreted as the fre-
quency of occurrences of z in the sequence of out-
comes, in the limit of infinitely many repetitions.
• BornB uses (?) to characterise a subjective belief
about the outcome of a future measurement. Pψ(z)
is interpreted as the maximum price a rational
agent would pay to enter a bet with payoff 1 if
outcome z is observed, and no payoff otherwise.
If one wishes to regard the Born rule as a basic postu-
late of physics then neither of these readings is entirely
satisfactory. BornF is constrained to hypothetical situ-
ations where a measurement can be repeated arbitrarily
many times under identical conditions. BornB does not
suffer from this restriction, but talks about an agent’s be-
lief rather than about physical observations. In addition,
it is also questionable whether a particular quantitative
expression such as (?) should really be given the sta-
tus of a postulate — instead of being derived from more
fundamental principles. The principle of relativity, for
instance, on which the theory of relativity is based, does
not refer to any particular numerical values.
This raises the question whether the Born rule could
be substituted by something else. Here we propose a pair
of alternative postulates. Crucially, neither of them relies
on the notion of probabilities (see Fig. 2)!
• Overlap: If ψ has no overlap with piz then the cor-
responding outcome z is not observed.
• Robust: Statements that relate ψ to observed out-
comes are robust under small perturbations of ψ.
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Figure 2. Non-probabilistic postulates. The postulates pro-
posed in this work, Overlap and Robust, establish a direct
connection between quantum states and observed measure-
ment outcomes, without a detour via probabilities.
While Overlap may be interpreted as a special case of (?),
we stress that it is of a different kind: rather than assign-
ing probabilities to quantum states, it relates quantum
states directly to observations. This, together with Ro-
bust, also makes it falsifiable by experiments.
The main technical contribution of this work is to show
that, if one takes Overlap and Robust as postulates, the
above interpretations of the Born rule can be derived.
The frequentist interpretation, in particular, is obtained
directly without any additional assumptions, i.e.,
Overlap ∧ Robust =⇒ BornF . (1)
The proof of this claim is provided in Section IV.
To retrieve the subjective interpretation, i.e., a state-
ment about an agent’s personal belief, we need to make
some extra assumptions concerning the agent’s reason-
ing.
• Repeat: The agent’s belief about the outcome of a
prepare-and-measure experiment does not depend
on whether or not they plan to repeat the same
experiment later on.
• Symmetry : The agent’s belief about a sequence of
outcomes obtained by repeating the same prepare-
and-measure experiment does not depend on how
the sequence is ordered.
Combined with the above, these assumptions suffice to
retrieve the Bayesian interpretation of the Born rule, i.e.,
Overlap ∧ Robust
Repeat ∧ Symmetry
}
=⇒ BornB . (2)
The derivation of this claim will be based on an idea of
de Finetti [3] and is explained in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Various approaches to derive the Born rule from more
fundamental principles have been proposed in the liter-
ature. One of them is to use purely mathematical ax-
ioms, according to which probabilities are abstract values
without any specific meaning. A prominent example for
such an approach is Gleason’s theorem [4]. It is based
on a non-contextuality assumption: given a fixed quan-
tum state ψ ∈ H, the probability Pψ(z) assigned to any
possible outcome z must be uniquely determined by the
corresponding projector piz (and hence be independent
of the other projectors that define the measurement). In
addition, H must be at least 3-dimensional. The theorem
then asserts that (?) holds.3
More recently, Saunders [5] as well as Auffe`ves and
Grangier [6] proposed modifications of Gleason’s argu-
ment, which use more operationally motivated axioms.
Zurek demonstrated that (?) can also be obtained from
a symmetry principle, called “environment-assisted in-
variance” [7], together with certain assumptions about
probabilities, made explicit in [8]. A similar derivation
of the probabilistic Born rule has been proposed by Leso-
vik [9], who uses a symmetry assumption together with
the assumption that the probability of finding a parti-
cle in a given region is determined by its wave function
amplitude in this region. The common feature of these
arguments, as well as of Gleason’s theorem, is that they
are based on assumptions about the probability distribu-
tion of measurement outcomes. In that respect they are
somewhat orthogonal to our objective, which is to have
postulates that talk about actual outcomes rather than
(abstract) probabilities.
An approach to obtain the Born rule without resort-
ing to probabilistic axioms is the decision-theoretic argu-
ment by Deutsch [10], and later refined by Wallace [11].
They showed that under certain assumptions about ra-
tionality, if a system in state ψ is measured, a ratio-
nal agent will bet on the outcome z with the maximal
value Pψ(z) as given by (?). The statement they derive
is thus similar in spirit to the Bayesian interpretation of
the Born rule, BornB. The original claim that the ax-
ioms used in [10, 11] are non-probabilistic has however
been questioned by Barnum et al. [12], who remarked
that the argument implicitly uses an assumption that re-
lates probabilities to the indistinguishability of particular
events.
A rather different line of reasoning, based on typi-
cality arguments, was proposed by Everett [13], Finkel-
stein [14], DeWitt and Graham [15, 16], and Hartle [17],
and was later strengthened by Farhi, Goldstone and Gut-
mann [18]. The idea is to start from an axiom similar
to Overlap and apply it to an experiment that is repeated
infinitely often. It is then shown that BornF holds for
“typical” sequences of measurement outcomes, i.e., for a
set of sequences of weight 1 according to some probabil-
ity measure on the set of infinite sequences. However, as
pointed out by Caves and Schack [19], additional assump-
tions are needed in order to define this probability mea-
sure. They, as well as Cassinello and Sa´nchez-Go´mez [20],
argue more generally that an axiom like Overlap alone
cannot suffice to retrieve BornF .
A possible additional assumption that could be used to
complete such typicality-based arguments was proposed
3 More precisely, it asserts that P (·) is a convex combination of
functions of the form (?), for different choices of ψ ∈ H.
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Figure 3. Structure of the framework. Physical theories are
regarded as constraints on the set Σ of possible stories. For
example, T could be quantum mechanics, and T ′ special rel-
ativity. A story about a moving train that has an infinitely
accurate location and velocity would be forbidden by T , and
hence be contained in the set T . A story according to which
the train moves faster than the speed of light would be in
T ′. The semantics of the stories is captured by their plots.
A story s may specify plots for multiple experiments, e.g.,
sExp⊂ [Exp] and sExp∗⊂ [Exp∗], for Exp and Exp∗, respectively.
by Buniy, Hsu and Zee [21]. Their idea is to postulate
that the quantum state space is fundamentally discrete.
This postulate is related to our axiom Robust, in the
sense that a theory with discrete state space is by defini-
tion robust against small perturbations of the states. A
similar robustness requirement has also been considered
by de Raedt, Katsnelson and Michielsen, and, together
with assumptions about logical inference, shown to imply
certain results of quantum theory [22].
Recently various approaches have been put forward to
derive the state-space structure of quantum theory from
physical axioms. They are however mostly based on the
idea that probabilities are an irreducible physical concept
(see, e.g., [23–25]). These works are hence complemen-
tary to ours: while we take the Hilbert space formalism of
quantum theory as given, we do not presuppose a physi-
cal notion of probabilities.
III. PHYSICS WITHOUT PROBABILITIES
To formulate our claims we use a framework, intro-
duced in [26] (see also [27]), that allows us to reason
about physical laws without relying on an a priori notion
of probabilities.4 The approach is inspired by Deutsch,
4 Most other frameworks, such as the Generalised Probabilistic
Theories approach [28], use conditional probability distributions
to represent physical states.
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Figure 4. Event space and plot. Any experiment Exp has an
event space [Exp]. In the example experiment described in
the text, the events are characterised by pairs (t, x). A story
about Exp, such as sv (Eq. 3), specifies a plot sExpv ⊂ [Exp]
(Eq. 4), i.e., a subset of events that occur according to sv.
who maintains that the primary purpose of a physical
theory is not to make predictions, but rather to “tell sto-
ries” that help us understand them [29, 30].
Following this idea, a first basic ingredient to the
framework we use is the notion of stories. Intuitively,
they are descriptions or explanations of a physical phe-
nomenon. Technically, we require that the set of all sto-
ries, which we denote by Σ, is countable (see the dis-
cussion at the end of Section IV for why this is impor-
tant). One may think of them as (arbitrarily long) finite
bit strings or, alternatively, finite sequences of English
words.5 An example would be
sv = “A train passes position x = 0 at time t = 0,and moves with velocity v.” (3)
(where v could be any value, e.g., v = 50 m/sec). A
physical theory, T , provides criteria that forbid certain
stories. For example, any story sv with v larger than the
speed of light would be forbidden by special relativity. In
the following, we denote by T the subset of Σ consisting
of all stories that are forbidden by T (cf. Fig. 3).
The second basic ingredient to our framework is the
notion of an experiment. By definition, any experiment,
Exp, has an event space, denoted by [Exp]. One should
think of the elements of [Exp] as the events (observable or
not) that are relevant to the analysis of the experiment.
The event space [Exp] is thus not dictated by nature,
but rather can be chosen depending on the question one
wishes to study. For example, if one is interested in the
kinematics of a train moving along a straight rail, one
may consider an experiment Exp whose event space [Exp]
consists of pairs (t, x) ∈ R2, indicating the time and the
position of the train (see Fig. 4).
Given an experiment Exp, a story s ∈ Σ may define a
plot, denoted by sExp. This is a subset of [Exp], whose
elements are to be interpreted as the events that actually
occur according to the story. For example, the plot of
story sv about Exp could be taken to be
sExpv = {(t, x = vt) : t ∈ R} . (4)
5 Another possibility is to represent stories as sequences of “clips”,
a notion introduced in [31].
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Figure 5. Typical prepare-and-measure experiment. A source
emits photons with polarisation ψ towards a polarising beam
splitter (PBS) that directs horizontally polarised photons to
one detector and vertically polarised ones to another. The
detection counts Nh and Nv may be fed into an analyser that
tests whether the relative frequencies are within a given range.
Hence, for any experiment Exp, we have a function
s→ sExp that equips stories s ∈ Σ with semantics, de-
tailed in terms of plots. This function can be (and usually
is) partial. That is, one defines sExp only for particular
stories s — those that tell us something about Exp and
are considered precise enough to specify a plot.
Within this framework, laws of physics are expressed
formally as conditions on the plots for appropriately cho-
sen experiments. To talk about the laws of special rela-
tivity theory, for instance, one could employ experiments
Exp with moving bodies such as the train example above.
That the theory rules out velocities faster than the speed
of light c could then be phrased as a condition on sto-
ries s: it should forbid any s ∈ Σ that violates
∀(t, x), (t′, x′) ∈ sExp : (x′ − x) < c(t′ − t) .
For our study of the Born rule, we will consider gen-
eral prepare-and-measure experiments. A typical exam-
ple could consist of a source that emits polarised photons,
which are subsequently measured to distinguish vertical
and horizontal polarisations (Fig. 5). Denoting the po-
larisation state space of each photon by K, the overall
state space of all emitted photons can be written as
H =
⊕
n∈N0
K⊗n . (5)
A natural choice for the event space of this experiment
is then
[Exp] =
{
(Ψ, z) : Ψ ∈ H, z=(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ {h, v}∗
}
(6)
where {h, v}∗ denotes the set of outcome tuples z =
(z1, . . . , zn) of arbitrary (but finite) length n, with zi ∈
{h, v} indicating whether the ith measurement gave hor-
izontal or vertical polarisation. A few examples of stories
one can tell about this experiment are listed in Table I.
According to the standard understanding of the Born
rule, stories s2, s3, and s6 should be ruled out, whereas
the situation is less obvious for s4.
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Figure 6. Robustness. A theory T satisfies Robust if for any
story s ∈ Σ that is not forbidden by T there exists a neigh-
bourhood Bε(s) of stories that are not forbidden, either. This
means that the set T of forbidden stories is closed.
IV. RETRIEVING THE FREQUENTIST RULE
The aim of this section is to make precise and prove
claim (1). We start by providing definitions for the
expressions Overlap, Robust, and BornF . To formulate
them, we take for granted that states of a quantum sys-
tem can be represented by vectors in a Hilbert space H,
and that measurements on that system correspond to
families of projectors {piz}z∈Z onH such that
∑
z∈Z piz =
idH. (This includes situations where the system of in-
terest is entangled with its environment, or where the
measurement is not projective, in which case H must be
taken to be the joint Hilbert space of the system together
with parts of the environment.) We always assume that
H is separable and that Z is countable.
We denote by P&MH,{piz} the set of all prepare-and-
measure experiments in which a system is prepared in
a state ψ ∈ H and measured with respect to {piz}z∈Z .
Following the approach introduced in Section III, we may
assign to them the event space
[Exp] = {(ψ, z) : ψ ∈ H, z ∈ Z} .
Note that the experiment described around (6) can be
regarded as one of P&MH,{piz} — just identify z with the
tuple (z1, . . . , zn) of individual measurement outcomes,
and ψ with the joint state Ψ of all measured subsystems.
Postulate Overlap
Postulate Overlap asserts that an outcome z whose pro-
jector piz has no overlap with ψ cannot occur. Within
our framework, the postulate is phrased as a property of
a theory T .
T satisfies Overlap if it forbids any story s according
to which the implication
pizψ = 0 =⇒ (ψ, z) /∈ sExp
is violated for some Exp ∈ P&MH,{piz}.
Note that this condition is pretty weak, for the impli-
cation is only violated if ψ is exactly orthogonal to piz.
It rules out none of the examples of Table I.
5story plot s
Exp
Exp ∈ P&MH,{pi(z1,...,zn)}
plot sExp∗
Exp∗ ∈ P&M∗K,{piz},fh<0.6
s1
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |h〉.
The measurement outcomes are always h.”
{
(|h〉⊗n, [hhhh · · · ]n1 : n ∈ N
} {
(|h〉⊗n, n) : n ∈ N
}
s2
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |h〉.
The measurement outcomes alternate between v and h.”
{
(|h〉⊗n, [vhvh · · · ]n1 : n ∈ N
} {
(|h〉⊗n, ok) : n ∈ N
}
s3
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |d〉.
The measurement outcomes are always h.”
{
(|d〉⊗n, [hhhh · · · ]n1 : n ∈ N
} {
(|d〉⊗n, n) : n ∈ N
}
s4
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |d〉.
The measurement outcomes alternate between v and h.”
{
(|d〉⊗n, [vhvh · · · ]n1 : n ∈ N
} {
(|d〉⊗n, ok) : n ∈ N
}
s5
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |d〉.
The number of measurement outcomes v is at any time at
least as large as the number of outcomes h.”
undefined
{
(|d〉⊗n, ok) : n ∈ N
}
s6
“The source repeatedly emits photons with polarisation |d〉.
The number of measurement outcomes h is at any time at
least twice as large as the number of outcomes v.”
undefined
{
(|d〉⊗n, n) : n ∈ N
}
Table I. Example stories and their plots. The stories talk about a prepare-and-measure experiment as depicted by Fig. 5.
We write |v〉 and |h〉 for the vertical and horizontal polarisation, respectively, and |d〉 = (|h〉+ |v〉)/√2 for one of the diagonal
directions. The precise meanings of the stories is specified by their plots. The third column shows the plots for the case where the
event space is taken to be that of (6). Its elements specify the joint prepared state and the sequence of outcomes z = (z1, . . . , zn).
Stories s5 and s6 are not precise enough to define these. The right column shows the plots for the variant of the experiment
that is used to formulate BornF , whose event space is defined by (8). Here the output sequence (z1, . . . , zn) is replaced by the
result t of a test; t = “ok” if the frequency fh of results zi = h is below an upper threshold, θ = 0.6, and t = n otherwise.
Postulate Robust
Our second postulate, Robust, makes criteria like the
above tolerant to perturbations. It demands from a the-
ory T that any story that is not forbidden by T has a
neighbourhood of non-forbidden stories (cf. Fig. 6).
To turn this into a precise statement, we use that the
event space [Exp] of any prepare-and-measure experiment
Exp ∈ P&MH,{piz} has a natural metric d induced by the
inner product 〈·|·〉 of the Hilbert space H, i.e.,
d
(
(ψ1, z1), (ψ2, z2)
)
=
{√〈ψ1−ψ2|ψ1−ψ2〉 if z1 = z2
∞ if z1 6= z2.
Since plots are subsets of the event space, we need to
turn d into a metric for sets of events. The canonical way
to do this is to use the corresponding Hausdorff distance,
which we denote by D.6 The metric D can then be pulled
back to the set of stories Σ using the (partial) function
s 7→ sExp. That is, we define DExp(s1, s2) = D(sExp1 , sExp2 ),
with the convention that DExp(s1, s2) = ∞ for s1 6= s2
whenever sExp1 or s
Exp
2 is undefined. In this way, any ex-
periment Exp gives rise to a canonical metric, DExp, on
the set Σ of stories.
6 The Hausdorff distance D between two subsets S and S′ of a
metric space (M,d) is defined as D(S, S′) = inf{ε : S ⊂ Bε(S′) ∧
S′ ⊂ Bε(S)}, where Bε(·) denotes the ε-ball around its argument
set, i.e., Bε(S) =
⋃
x∈S{y ∈M : d(x, y) ≤ ε}.
T satisfies Robust if the set T of stories it forbids is
closed w.r.t. the topology induced by DExp, for any
Exp ∈ P&MH,{piz}.
Postulate BornF
Before stating the precise definition of BornF , let us
first have a look at the familiar example of a (classi-
cal) coin tossing experiment. If we repeatedly throw a
fair coin, we would expect the relative frequency fheads
of outcome “heads” to get closer and closer to 12 , but
to keep fluctuating around that value. To make a more
definitive statement, we may fix a threshold θ > 12 and,
after any toss, check whether fheads is below θ. Suppose
that in each round when this is not the case, i.e., when-
ever fheads ≥ θ, we get a yellow card. If θ is only slightly
larger than 12 , we will probably get many yellow cards at
the beginning. However, they will become more and more
rare, until we will stop getting any. Intuitively, a condi-
tion for a coin to be fair is hence that, for any threshold
θ > 12 , we will only get a finite number of yellow cards.
Applying this idea to quantum mechanics, we may
consider a prepare-and-measure experiment where many
identical subsystems with Hilbert space K are prepared
and measured individually with respect to a family of
projectors {pizi}zi∈Z on K. Just like in the case of coin
tossing, one can think of the preparation and measure-
ment of the subsystems K as a sequential process (cf.
Fig. 5 for an example). Suppose that the experiment
is equipped with a test device that continuously checks
whether the relative frequency fzˆ of a predefined out-
6come zˆ ∈ Z in the measured tuple (z1, . . . , zn) is below
a fixed threshold, θ. Whenever this is the case, it out-
puts t = “ok”, and else t = n, corresponding to a yellow
card with the number n of the current round written
on it. (This number will make the counting of yellow
cards easier.) The test device thus effectively carries out
a measurement on the overall state space H, which has
the form (5), with respect to the family of projectors
{Πt}t∈{ok}∪N defined by
Πn =
∑
(z1,...,zn)∈Z×n
|{i: zi=zˆ}|≥θn
n⊗
i=1
pizi (7)
for t = n ∈ N, and Πok = idH−
⊕∞
n=1 Πn for t = ok. We
denote the set of all such experiments, which is a subclass
of P&MH,{Πt}, by P&M
∗
K,{piz},fzˆ<θ. Any experiment
Exp∗ of this class has an event space of the form
[Exp∗] = {(Ψ, t) : Ψ ∈ H, t ∈ {ok} ∪ N} , (8)
where Ψ is the joint state of all subsystems and t is the
outcome of the test (cf. Table I for example plots).
Postulate BornF refers to the particular case where all
subsystems are prepared in the same state ψ ∈ K, so that
their joint state, Ψ ∈ H, lies in the subspace
Hψ = span{ψ⊗n : n ∈ N0} .
The postulate demands that, for any given threshold
θ > ‖pizˆψ‖2, if one repeats the measurement {pizi}zi∈Z
sufficiently often, the relative frequency fzˆ of outcome
zˆ will remain below θ. In other words, for any story s,
there is an upper bound on the number n ∈ N for which
a yellow card is issued according to s.
T satisfies BornF if it forbids any story s according to
which the implication
‖pizˆψ‖2 < θ =⇒
∣∣{n : ∃Ψ ∈ Hψ, (Ψ, n) ∈ sExp∗}∣∣ <∞
is violated for some Exp∗ ∈ P&M∗K,{piz},fzˆ<θ.
This criterion obviously rules out stories s2, s3, and
s6 of Table I. Considering s4, one may also regard the
creation and measurement of two photons as one sin-
gle repetition of a prepare-and-measure experiment, with
prepared state |d〉⊗2 and a measurement with respect to
{piv ⊗ piv, piv ⊗ pih, pih ⊗ piv, pih ⊗ pih}. It is then straight-
forward to see that the criterion also rules out s4.
Claim (1)
Everything is now in place to state the first main result.
Theorem 1. If a theory T satisfies Overlap and Robust
then it also satisfies BornF.
Proof. Consider any experiment Exp∗ from the set
P&M∗K,{piz},fzˆ<θ, with θ ∈ [0, 1], as well as any ψ ∈ K
such that ‖pizˆψ‖2 < θ. We need to show that any story s
that violates the implication in the definition of BornF ,
i.e., for which∣∣{n : ∃Ψ ∈ Hψ, (Ψ, n) ∈ sExp∗}∣∣ =∞ (9)
holds, is forbidden by any theory T that satisfies Overlap
and Robust.
For any m ∈ N0, let
F≥mθ =
(m−1⊕
n=0
id⊗nK
)
⊕
( ∞⊕
n=m
(
id⊗nK −Πn
))
,
with Πn (which depends on θ) defined by (7), be the pro-
jector onto the subspace of H associated to all outcome
tuples z = (z1, . . . , zn) except those that have at least
length m and whose relative frequency of entries zi = zˆ
is at least θ. In particular, we have
n ≥ m =⇒ ΠnF≥mθ = 0 . (10)
We first argue that applying the projector F≥mθ onto any
state Ψ ∈ Hψ leaves that state almost unchanged when m
is large. For this we use that a state of the form ψ⊗n lies,
for n large, almost entirely in the (typical) subspace gen-
erated by projectors piz1⊗· · ·⊗pizn for tuples (z1, . . . , zn)
whose relative frequency of zˆ is close to ‖pizˆψ‖2. A quan-
titative variant of this statement is Lemma 4 in the ap-
pendix, with pi0 = pizˆ and pi1 the sum of all piz with z 6= zˆ.
Writing Ψ =
∑
n αnψ
⊗n, where αn are coefficients such
that
∑
n |αn|2 = 1, we obtain
〈Ψ|F≥mθ |Ψ〉 =
∑
n∈N0
|αn|2〈ψ⊗n|F≥mθ |ψ⊗n〉
= 1−
∑
n≥m
|αn|2〈ψ⊗n|Πn|ψ⊗n〉
≥ 1−max
n≥m
n e−2n(f−‖pizˆψ‖
2)2 .
The expression in the maximum over n tends to 0 for n
large. We have thus established that
lim
m→∞ supΨ∈Hψ
∥∥F≥mθ Ψ−Ψ∥∥ = 0 . (11)
Next we use F≥mθ to modify stories. Let F≥mθ,ψ be the
function on the event space [Exp∗] defined by
F≥mθ,ψ (Ψ, t) =
(
F
≥m
θ
Ψ
‖F≥m
θ
Ψ‖ , t) if Ψ ∈ Hψ
(Ψ, t) otherwise.
Applying this function element-wise to the events of a
plot induces a function on the set Σ of stories, which we
also denote by F≥mθ,ψ . That is, for any s ∈ Σ, F≥mθ,ψ (s)
is a story identical to s, except that its plot for experi-
7ment Exp∗ is modified to
F≥mθ,ψ (s)Exp
∗
= {F≥mθ,ψ (Ψ, t) : (Ψ, t) ∈ sExp
∗} .
It follows from (11) that
lim
m→∞D
Exp∗(F≥mθ,ψ (s), s) = 0 . (12)
Consider now any theory T that satisfies Overlap and
Robust, and let s be any story for which (9) holds. The
latter implies that for any m ∈ N there exists n ≥ m and
Ψ ∈ Hψ such that(
F
≥m
θ
Ψ
‖F≥m
θ
Ψ‖ , n
)
∈ F≥mθ,ψ (s)Exp
∗
.
According to (10), the projector Πn has no overlap with
the modified state on the left hand side. Overlap thus
implies that the modified story is forbidden, i.e.,
F≥mθ,ψ (s) ∈ T ,
for any m ∈ N. In addition, we know from (12) that the
modified stories, for m large, approximate s, i.e.,
lim
m→∞F
≥m
θ,ψ (s) = s .
Since T is closed due to Robust, we can conclude that T
must also contain s. We have thus established that s is
forbidden by T , which is what we set out to prove.
Before concluding this section, we note that the con-
verse of Theorem 1 may not hold. That is, there could
exist a theory T that satisfies BornF , but violates Overlap
or Robust. To see this, consider a story s that is defined
like s4 in Table I, but asserts that the sequence of indi-
vidual outcomes zi, instead of alternating between h and
v, corresponds to a binary representation of the num-
ber Pi. Since Pi has a finite description, s is a valid
story. Furthermore, since the binary representation of Pi
has no (known) repeating pattern, a theory T can satisfy
BornF without forbidding s. Conversely, following the
lines of the proof above, one can construct a sequence of
stories that approximate s and yet violate the condition
in Overlap. Hence, if T satisfies Overlap and Robust then
T must forbid s, too. This establishes that Overlap and
Robust together are more restrictive than BornF .
A similar argument also shows why it is important to
demand that Σ be countable. If it was not, Σ could con-
tain stories like s above, but now for all possible infinite
sequences of outcomes. A theory that satisfies Overlap
and Robust would then necessarily rule out all of them.
V. REINTRODUCING PROBABILITIES
In this section we explain and prove claim (2), thus
establishing a Bayesian reading of the Born rule. We
start by providing definitions for Repeat, Symmetry , and
BornB. Unlike Overlap and Robust, which we defined in
the previous section, they should not be regarded as (ob-
jective) physical postulates. Rather, they are attributes
of an agent’s subjective belief about future observations.
They also do not depend on quantum mechanics. To
phrase them, we may consider any data-generating pro-
cess, provided that it is in principle repeatable.
According to the Bayesian approach, an agent’s belief
is represented by probabilities [3, 32]. Consider, for in-
stance, a quantity Z that is only revealed later to the
agent. We may then assign to any possible value z of Z
a real number, P (z), with the following meaning:
P (z) ∼= “maximum amount that the agent would be ready to payfor a bet with payoff 1 if Z = z and 0 otherwise”
One can show that, if the agent’s reasoning is rational, in
the sense that no combination of her bets would lead to
a sure loss, then the values P (z) satisfy the usual axioms
of probability theory [33]. In particular, they are non-
negative and sum up to 1.
Suppose now that the agent enters the following gam-
bling game. She is given a randomly chosen initial bonus
M ∈ N,7 and then plays in rounds, numbered by n. In
each of them, the same process is invoked to generate
a data point Zn with alphabet Z. At the start of each
round, the agent must pay an entry fee of 1, but then
earns the amount r if (and only if) a particular outcome,
Zn = zˆ, occurs, where zˆ ∈ Z and r > 1 are constants.
The rules also say that the agent must play at least M
rounds (which is always possible with the initial bonus),
but has to stop when she runs out of money. Denoting
by Z the tuple consisting of the outcomes Zn obtained
during the entire game and by |Z| its length, correspond-
ing to the number of rounds played, we have
M ≤ |Z| ≤M + r
|Z|−1∑
n=1
δ(Zn, zˆ) , (13)
where δ(x, y) = 1 if x = y and δ(x, y) = 0 otherwise.
The definitions below all refer to an agent’s belief about
the quantities Z and M occurring in this game. Techni-
cally, they are expressed as properties of the joint prob-
ability distribution PZM .
Property Repeat
Property Repeat, which enters as an assumption in
claim (2), captures the idea that the agent’s personal
belief about the outcome Zn of the next round does not
depend on whether it is planned to continue later. In
the gambling game, the value M has no other effect than
7 We assume that PM (m) > 0 for any m ∈ N, which ensures that
conditioning on the event M = m is well defined.
8setting lower and upper bounds on the number of repe-
titions, which we stated in (13). As a necessary require-
ment, we may therefore demand that the gambler’s belief
about Zn before starting round n is independent of M .
An agent’s belief satisfies Repeat if8
PZn|Z1···Zn−1,|Z|≥n = PZn|Z1···Zn−1,|Z|≥n,M=m
for any n,m ∈ N.
Note that the condition |Z| ≥ n ensures that the out-
come Zn is defined.
Property Symmetry
This property appears as another assumption in
claim (2). It demands that, if the game is played for
at least m rounds, then the agent’s belief about the first
m outcomes, Z1, . . . , Zm, does not depend on their or-
dering.
An agent’s belief satisfies Symmetry if
PZ1···Zm|M=m = PZpi(1)···Zpi(m)|M=m
for any m ∈ N and any permutation pi on {1, . . . ,m}.
Property BornB
So far, we have not said anything about the process
that generates the values Zn in the gambling game. But
now, to phrase property BornB — the Bayesian interpre-
tation of the Born rule — we obviously need to bring in
quantum mechanics. We therefore assume that the data-
generating process is of the prepare-and-measure type as
described earlier. For BornB it suffices to consider one
single round of the game. However, Theorem 2 below
uses Repeat and Symmetry as assumptions, which involve
multiple rounds, and one should think of each round as
consisting of the same state preparation and measure-
ment.
An agent’s belief satisfies BornB if
PZ1(zˆ) = ‖pizˆψ‖2 ,
for any zˆ ∈Z, whenever the prepared state is ψ ∈ K,
and the measurement is carried out with respect to
{piz}z∈Z .
8 The equality is meant to hold for all arguments (z1, . . . , zn)
for which the conditional probability PZn|Z1···Zn−1,|Z|≥n is de-
fined, which is the case whenever PZ1···Zn−1||Z|≥n(z1, . . . , zn−1)
is strictly positive.
Claim (2)
Theorem 2 below is a verbose formulation of claim (2).
In addition to Repeat and Symmetry , which were ex-
plained above, it is assumed that the agent’s personal
belief is compatible with a given theory T . By this we
mean that the agent assigns probability 0 to all events
that only occur according to stories s ∈ Σ that are for-
bidden by T .
Theorem 2. If an agent’s belief satisfies Repeat
and Symmetry, and is compatible with a theory for
which BornF holds, then it also satisfies BornB.
Proof. We will show that, under the assumptions of the
theorem, for any zˆ ∈ Z,
PZ1(zˆ) ≤ ‖pizˆψ‖2 (14)
holds. BornB, which has an equality instead of an in-
equality, then follows because, when taking the sum over
zˆ ∈ Z, both sides of (14) add up to 1.
Suppose that the agent plays the gambling game de-
scribed above, with the constant r set to any value within
the open interval (1, ‖pizˆψ‖−2), where we assume without
loss of generality that ‖pizˆψ‖2 < 1 (otherwise (14) is triv-
ial). We first argue that, if the agent decides to continue
playing for as long as possible, she will run out of money
with certainty.
Let θ be any fixed real from the open interval
(‖pizˆψ‖2, r−1). Furthermore, for any n,m ∈ N, let
Θnm =
{
(z1, . . . , zn) : inf
k≤n
m− k + r
k∑
i=1
δ(zi, zˆ) ≥ 1
}
be the set of all tuples z = (z1, . . . , zn) of outcomes of
the first n rounds for which an initial bonus of M = m
coins suffices to play for at least one more round n + 1.
For n sufficiently larger than m, namely
n ≥ m
r−1 − θ ,
any z ∈ Θnm satisfies
n∑
i=1
δ(zi, zˆ) ≥ n−m
r
≥ θn ,
which is the property measured by the projector Πn de-
fined by (7). However, since θ > ‖pizˆψ‖2, stories accord-
ing to which this property holds for n ∈ N arbitrarily
large are forbidden by any theory that fulfils BornF . We
have thus established that the agent, if her strategy was
to continue playing as long as she has money left, must
assign probability 1 to the event that she will run out of
money after finitely many rounds. Note also that the
probability distributions occurring in the assumptions
Repeat and Symmetry do not depend on the choice of
strategy. We can therefore assume in the following that
9the agent decides to play until she runs out of money (al-
though this is obviously not a profitable strategy). We
thus get a finite tuple Z of outcomes such that
(Z1, . . . , Zn−1) ∈ Θn−1M ⇐⇒ |Z| ≥ n (15)
holds for any n ∈ N.
We now define a distribution P ∗¯Z over (infinite) se-
quences Z¯ = (Z¯n)n∈N by
P ∗¯
Zn|Z¯1···Z¯n−1 = PZn|Z1···Zn−1,M≥n
= PZn|Z1···Zn−1,|Z|≥n,M≥n ,
where the second equality holds because M ≥ n =⇒
|Z| ≥ n (see (13)), ensuring that the probabilities for Zn
are defined. In the following we write zn1 for the first n
entries of a tuple z. Because of Repeat and (15), we have
P ∗
Z¯n|Z¯n−11 =zn−11
= PZn|Zn−11 =zn−11 ,M=m (16)
for any n,m ∈ N and any tuple z satisfying zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m .
By induction over n, and using that
zn1 ∈ Θnm =⇒ zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m ,
we can turn (16) into
P ∗¯
Z1···Z¯n(z
n
1 ) = PZ1···Zn|M=m(zn1 ) (17)
whenever zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m . This also implies that
P ∗¯
Z1···Z¯n = PZ1···Zn|M=m (18)
whenever n ≤ m, because under this condition the set
Θn−1m contains all possible (n− 1)-tuples.
Condition (15), together with the fact (established
above) that Z has a finite length |Z| ≥ m with certainty,
implies that, conditioned on any M = m, the event
∃n ≥ m : Zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m and Zn1 /∈ Θnm
occurs with certainty. Inserting the definition of Θnm, this
is equivalent to the claim that the event
∃n ≥ m : Zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m and m− n+ r
n∑
i=1
δ(Zi, zˆ) < 1
occurs with certainty conditioned on M = m. Note that
this statement only involves probabilities of n-tuples Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zn) such that Zn−11 ∈ Θn−1m . Hence, by virtue
of (17), we can conclude that the above event also occurs
with certainty when Z is replaced by Z¯ sampled according
to the probability distribution P ∗Z¯. In particular, for any
m ∈ N, the event
∃n ≥ m : Z¯n−11 ∈ Θn−1m and
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Z¯i, zˆ) < r−1
occurs with certainty. We have thus established that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Z¯i, zˆ) ≤ r−1 (19)
holds with certainty for Z¯ = (Z¯n)n∈N sampled according
to P ∗¯Z.
To conclude the argument, we recall that r was an
arbitrary real from the open interval (1, ‖pizˆψ‖−2), i.e.,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Z¯i, zˆ) ≥ ‖pizˆψ‖2 + ε (20)
has probability 0 for any ε > 0. Because of the assump-
tion Symmetry and (18), the sequence Z¯ is exchange-
able. The representation theorem of de Finetti [3] im-
plies that such sequences have the property that their
joint distribution can be written as a convex combina-
tion of distributions of the form P×n
Z¯
. Furthermore, this
convex combination must contain distributions PZ¯ such
that PZ¯(zˆ) ≥ P ∗¯Z1(zˆ). This implies that, with probabil-
ity strictly larger than zero, the frequency of zˆ in the se-
quence Z¯ is equal or larger than P ∗¯
Z1
(zˆ). This statement
is made precise by Lemma 5 in the appendix. Using now
that (20) has probability 0, the lemma implies
P ∗¯
Z1
(zˆ) < ‖pizˆψ‖2 + ε .
Using that ε > 0 is arbitrary and, again, (18), we get
PZ1|M=m(zˆ) ≤ ‖pizˆψ‖2
for any m ≥ 1, which immediately implies (14).
Combining Theorem 2 with Theorem 1, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 3. If an agent’s belief satisfies Repeat and
Symmetry, and is compatible with a theory for which
Overlap and Robust hold, then it also satisfies BornB.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Theorem 1 and 2 show that the experimentally rele-
vant consequences of the Born rule can as well be ob-
tained from two alternative physical postulates, Overlap
and Robust — together with certain natural assumptions
about rational reasoning. These postulates have interest-
ing features, which make them suitable as potential sub-
stitutes for the Born rule. Firstly, they are more general,
for they are not restricted to experiments where a par-
ticular measurement is repeated arbitrarily often under
identical conditions. Secondly, they come closer to the
idea that physical postulates should be generic principles
rather than specific quantitative statements.
The argument presented here may also shed new light
on the nature of the Born rule itself. Is it an (objective)
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physical law, as suggested by BornF? Or is it rather a
statement about (subjective) beliefs, as in BornB? While
the former view is implicit to many standard quantum
mechanics textbooks, the latter is probably most con-
sequently advocated by QBism [34], which regards the
Born rule as an empirical addition to Bayesian probabil-
ity theory. Corollary 3 suggests that the Born rule could
in reality just be a “blend”, consisting both of objective
and subjective ingredients. Indeed, Overlap and Robust
are of the same objective kind as the usual physical laws,
whereas Repeat and Symmetry are manifestly subjective.
The Born rule may hence be viewed as the result of taking
(objective) physical postulates and supplementing them
with rules for (subjective) rational reasoning.
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APPENDIX
The following bound is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Results of this type are well established in information
theory [35]. They are sometimes referred to as typical-
ity bounds. For completeness, we nevertheless provide a
statement with a proof.
Lemma 4. Let pi0, pi1 be projectors on a Hilbert space K
such that pi0 + pi1 = idK, let ψ ∈ K be normalised, let
k, n ∈ N, and define
Π =
∑
(b1,...,bn)∈{0,1}n∑
i
bi=n−k
pib1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ pibn .
Then
〈ψ⊗n|Π|ψ⊗n〉 ≤ e−2n(〈ψ|pi0|ψ〉− kn )2 .
Proof. Let pb = 〈ψ|pib|ψ〉 for b ∈ {0, 1}, and note that
〈ψ⊗n|Π|ψ⊗n〉 =
(
n
k
)
pk0p
n−k
1 .
For k = 0, the right hand side equals pn1 = en ln p1 , which
cannot be larger than e−2n(1−p1)2 , so that the claimed
bound holds. The same is true, analogously, for k = n.
For k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} we use Stirling’s approximation to
bound the binomial, leading to
〈ψ⊗n|Π|ψ⊗n〉 < e2pi
√
n
k(n− k)
nn
kk(n− k)n−k p
k
0p
n−k
1 .
With the definition q0 = kn and q1 =
n−k
n , this can be
further bounded by
〈ψ⊗n|Π|ψ⊗n〉 < e−n(q0 ln
q0
p0
+q1 ln q1p1 )
≤ e−2n(p0−q0)2 ,
where we have used Pinsker’s inequality [36, 37] in the
second line.
The lemma below, which is used in the proof of Theo-
rem 2, is a relatively straightforward consequence of the
de Finetti representation theorem [3].
Lemma 5. Let (Xi)i∈N be an exchangeable sequence of
random variables on X , i.e.,
PX1···Xn = PXpi(1)···Xpi(n)
for any n ∈ N and any permutation pi on {1, . . . , n}.
Then, for any ξ ∈ X , the event
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Xi, ξ) ≥ PX1(ξ)
has non-zero probability.
Proof. Because of the exchangeability property, de
Finetti’s theorem asserts that there exists a probability
measure dµ on the distributions QX over X such that
PX1···Xn =
∫
Q×nX dµ(QX) (21)
for any n ∈ N. We may therefore interpret QX(ξ) as a
random variable distributed according to dµ such that
the distribution of the n-tuple (X1, . . . , Xn) conditioned
on QX satisfies
PX1···Xn|QX = Q
×n
X .
Hence, by the strong law of large numbers, the relative
frequency of the symbol ξ in that n-tuple equals QX(ξ),
i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Xi, ξ) = QX(ξ)
with certainty. It thus remains to show that QX(ξ) ≥
PX1(ξ) with non-zero probability. To see this, assume by
contradiction that the claim is wrong, i.e., that QX(ξ) <
PX1(ξ) with certainty. But then, taking the average
over QX , we obtain∫
QX(ξ)dµ(QX) < PX1(ξ) ,
which contradicts (21).
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